

OUR DUTY
TOWARDS ANIMALS

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*A QUESTION CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY*

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OUR DUTY TOWARDS ANIMALS.

THE question of what are our duties towards animals will very shortly become a matter of very great importance to mankind at large—of pressing personal importance to every one. The advocates of the rights of brutes, or animalists, as they may be called, will very likely succeed in wholly abolishing field-sports, and experiments on living animals. As soon as they have done this they will at once proceed to attack the custom of reducing the brutes to slavery and enforced toil. For it is plain that the animals cannot be made docile and useful to man without the infliction of pain, whether by the necessary mutilation or by the process of breaking in. Further, the reduction to slavery, the keeping in captivity, is itself an outrage on their rights. Last of all, the right of killing animals for food will be taken away. There can be no doubt about this. Those who are most active in opposing field-sports

and the like, hold that it is immoral to put animals to death for any purpose, whether to procure a zoological specimen,* or to provide food or clothing, or for any other service of mankind.

It is, then, not only the country gentleman and the biologist who are concerned in knowing what moralists may teach us as to our relations to the brutes. Every person who makes use of the forced labour of animals, who drives at any time in a carriage, or has anything brought to him by animals, or whose shoes are made of leather, or who consumes flesh, fish, milk, eggs, honeycomb, or any other animal product, or who collects beetles, butterflies, or shells, will soon have to ask himself what his duties towards the brutes may be. And he should be provided with some consistent grounds and reasons for his conduct towards the brutes, and not be dependent on the mere impulse of the moment for what he is pleased to condemn or approve.

The animalists have attacked the physiologists first, because it was easy to raise an agitation against practices which must be imperfectly understood if no special training had been gone through, and

* "Animals, then, have in the abstract the same Right of Life and the same Right of Personal Liberty as we. . . . You have as much right to kill it (*i.e.* a beetle or a butterfly) for a 'specimen' as you would have to kill a rare kind of Polynesian savage."—E. B. Nicholson, "Rights of an Animal," chap. vii.

which could be readily described in highly coloured, if not grossly exaggerated, language. Now it is the turn of the country gentleman. Fox-hunting is denounced as an immoral sport ; and doubtless that, and all kinds of shooting, fishing, and hunting, will be forbidden by reformed and radical parliaments. As soon as this is done the farmer will be told that it is against the law of morals to mutilate horses and cattle, or to chastise them to teach them to obey our will. Still more wicked will it be to murder, and then, as in the case of the bees, to rob them of their hard-earned savings.

And the more enthusiastic of the advocates of the rights of animals will not be satisfied unless our duties be extended so as to embrace more than the animal kingdom. We must be taught that we have duties as well to the plants and to the stones. The writer of a letter to the *S. James's Gazette*, in March, 1885, who thinks that he can improve upon the words of the Gospel as well as upon its morals, recommends as an axiom, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these My *creatures* ye have done it unto Me." This writer ought to be aware that the stones are as much God's creatures as the angels. Perhaps he shares the view that some philosophers have taught, that both plants and stones have knowledge and feeling. It is stated that the speculations of modern biologists

have had much to do with the rise of the doctrine of the rights of brutes. But if the speculations of biology are to influence our conduct, how much more the facts? It has been well known to biologists for many years past that it is impossible to distinguish plants from animals. Their life is the same. The late Mr. Darwin showed that plants feel, digest, almost see, as animals do. If, then, we have duties to the animals, it is certain that we have duties to the plants. What, then, about the horrible cruelties daily practised in the gardens and woods? We shall soon see established a society for the protection of plants, which will be to many of us a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Let us, then, see what Christian philosophy has to teach us on the matter in hand ; and first, let us reject without hesitation, all attempts to decide this point on mere motives of expediency. Whatever advantages may be gained by the domination of man over the brutes cannot be weighed for an instant against the injury that would be done to the character by knowingly breaking a moral law. The man of the world, whatever his profession may be, will hold, of course, that animals are to be treated in a way that affords himself the greatest pleasure or comfort, provided that he do not outrage public opinion, and thus cause himself greater inconvenience. This is the motive that

runs throughout the Report of the "Commission on the practice of subjecting live animals to experiments for scientific purposes." A large number of scientific men were examined, and a large number of men vehemently opposed to vivisection ; but not a single expert in morals, not one man who had formed an independent opinion on the subject as a part of the science of morals, not even a Professor of Moral Philosophy from one of the universities. The Commissioners' report is a mere trimming between the two contending parties, how much to grant to the one without exasperating the other, and shows all the cynical disregard of the politician for a question of right or wrong. If vivisection be wrong, let it be crushed out at once, whatever bait it may hold out to us. If it be right, let it have free play, for those who are skilled in such matters tell us that it has accomplished so much in the past that it will in all likelihood do the same in the future.

It is admitted universally, without dispute, that the question of the rights of animals is a question in morals, and the friends of animals have lately appealed to ethics as the authority to decide the precise limits of the dominion of man over the beasts. By all means let us accept this appeal. It may be that the decision of the moralists will not be so entirely favourable to the appellants as

they expect; but as they have themselves allowed the case to be a question in morals, not in taste or in sympathy, they cannot complain of the judgment which they have themselves invoked.*

First of all, as to conscience. An appeal to conscience in the present day is avoided by many because it usually precedes an unusual act of baseness. But though the appeal to conscience has thus a bad name, yet it is necessary for us to ask ourselves how far a man's individual conscience, or even that of whole nations and ages, may be considered a safe guide. Now, history teaches us that the conscience of one nation has taught the exact opposite of another. Take, for example, the practice of duelling. This has always been forbidden by the Church; but a hundred years ago the conscience of society, the public opinion of all Europe, con-

* In the nineteenth century the difference between that which is immoral and that which is offensive is not always kept in mind. As an instance, a writer, unhappily striving still more to loosen what bonds of marriage are left to us in England, says, "Our Divorce Court of to-day is as savage and barbarous an institution ethically as the fixing up on spikes of the heads of criminals was in old days on London Bridge." (*Fortnightly Review*, May, 1885, p. 653.) What can this writer's notion of *ethics* be? Is there any law, human or divine, which forbids the exposure of traitors' heads if it be thought needful by the State? It can only serve to confuse ideas, if loathsome, offensive, or disagreeable, is to connote immoral. It is an attempt to call in the heart to overpower the intellect. What can be more loathsome than the duties of a nurse in a hospital, or of an aid on the field of battle? But they have not yet been called immoral.

demned a man who refused to fight a duel to a social excommunication. He was a pariah, an outcast. At last, for some few years, it was suppressed in this country ; and to show the constancy of the judgment of society in these matters, it is now said that the practice is likely to be revived, as the only means by which certain men can be kept within bounds. Which is to decide this question in morals—the weathercock of public opinion or the unaltering voice of Christian moralists ?

Now, in the matter of the rights of animals, we are told that the English conscience of the nineteenth century—public opinion—has pronounced its decision. It may be so ; but to give value to such a decision it must be in accordance with the judgments of past ages, and of other Christian countries.* It will be worthless if it be contradictory to that of other Christian centuries and countries. It will be only valuable if it conform to the Vincentian canon. It will be seen hereafter that it does not. And what is the nineteenth

* It is to be regretted that in the paper circulated among the members of Convocation of the University of Oxford, on March 10, 1885, the opinion is expressed that vivisection should be prohibited, “because it is abhorrent to a very large number,” and to “public opinion.” There is thus no pretence of making it a moral question. It was not by appealing to public opinion that the old Tractarians fifty years ago began their revival of Catholic faith and morals ; and the men who signed this paper are singularly unfitted to be rulers and teachers in a Church which stakes its existence on the success of its appeal to antiquity in all matters of faith and morals.

century that it should oppose itself to the other Christian ages? Is it a century which has made such great progress in the study of morals that its public opinion may be trusted never to go wrong? When the history of this age comes to be written, it will be said that it was a time in which the physical sciences made great progress, enormous progress. But great progress in these sciences hardly qualifies a man or an age for an offhand judgment in cases of conscience. The aim of the natural sciences is merely to make men eat well, drink well, and sleep well—the Paradise that Monsieur Parolles would have desired. But in the nobler sciences and arts, the nineteenth century has not merely made no progress, it has gone back. Architecture, which at this moment is the most flourishing of the arts of the nineteenth century, is but a careful reproduction of the architecture of past times. Sculpture hardly rises to the level of the bas-reliefs of the arch of Constantine. As to the political arts, we know to our cost, in 1885, that the art of government (in England, at least) is lost. For fifty years there has not been a minister who has attained mediocrity as a statesman. In literature, the English language has reached the last stage of corruption; the writers of the reign of Elizabeth are to the writers of the reign of Victoria, much as

the Latin authors of Augustus are to those of Augustulus.

A writer in a journal not much given to pessimism, the *Church Quarterly Review* (for July, 1884), says: "Of the centuries since the revival of learning, it may, perhaps, be said that in the seventeenth the predominant idea of God was that of Infinite Power, in the eighteenth of Infinite Wisdom, in the nineteenth of Infinite Good-nature. He is essentially *le bon Dieu* of modern France—a sort of deified stage-father, never so happy as when, almost unsolicited, he is forgiving the peccadilloes of his children." Now if the nineteenth century be before all things good-natured, it must of necessity be an immoral age. Good-nature is one of the vices which apes the character of the virtue for which it seeks to pass. Just as by the side of religion there is superstition, and by the side of clemency there is false pity, so by the side of real goodness there is good-nature.

Akin to its effeminacy, there are other and more grievous vices which the nineteenth century has made its own; which eat into the character, and render the conscience valueless as a guide. Besides establishing a Divorce Court, and legalizing adultery and incest, the nineteenth century has taught women to ape the manners of the *demi-monde*, and, under the pretence of giving them edu-

cation, it infects girls with ideas and facts of which no modest woman need have any knowledge; most impure details have been put into print, and scattered broadcast amongst boys and girls; and the journal which has done this has received the approval of high ecclesiastics. If horrible things are done in the streets, still more unspeakable vices are prevalent in our universities and public schools. No earlier age has seen the like. We must go back to the time of William Rufus for a society so rotten to the core. If the conscience of the nineteenth century is to teach us a new chapter in ethics, it should come to us with a perfect observance of the duties that are recognized as binding by all the world. If the present age is to invent new crimes, it might at least strive to enforce old moral duties; but for some time past Parliament has spent much of its time in encouraging the breaking of the seventh and eighth commandments. The conscience of an age which applauds theft and murder in Ireland, and condones impurity everywhere, may safely be disregarded.

The variableness of this public opinion is in strong contrast with the unchanging character of Christian morals. Writers who approach Christianity from such different standpoints as Cudworth and the late Dr. Ward, assert the immutable nature of morals. There is the well-known posthumous

treatise of Cudworth on this subject, and Dr. Ward says : " Moral truths are an integral part of Divine revelation ; and that though, like other revealed verities, they admit elucidation and development, yet they are not progressive." (" Philosophy of Theism," vol. i. p. 112.) So that to prove an opinion in morals to be new amongst Christians is the same thing as to condemn it.

It will be admitted by all that the Christian religion has set before the world the highest code of ethics that mankind has seen. Even those who are most hostile to the faith allow the purity and nobleness of its moral teaching. Let us see, then, what Christianity has to tell us of our duty to the brutes.

There are two commandments, our Lord says, which exhaust our duty, on which " hang all the law and the prophets," viz., the love of God and the love of our neighbour ; (S. Matt. xxii. 40,) which correspond to the two tables of the law. Within our duty to God and our duty to man all our duties are included. Duties to visible creatures, animals, plants, or minerals are not spoken of. In the Christian system there is no progressive development in ethics. What is wrong to-day was wrong a thousand years ago ; and if the brutes have any rights in the nineteenth century, they must have had rights in the first.

The same with the ten commandments : they

give no hint of duties beyond those to God and our neighbour. Lately an attempt has been made to bring under the heading of the sixth commandment acts of cruelty to animals, just as moralists bring acts of cruelty to men; but S. Augustine, the great authority in all Western theology, expressly says that the sixth commandment does not apply to the brute animals, their life and their death being given to our use by the Creator. ("De civitate Dei," lib. i. cap. xx.)

In the direct teachings of Revelations, then, there is a marked silence as to any duties to the brutes, and this is the more remarkable because it seems almost impossible that silence should have been kept if duties to the brutes had been considered important elements of ethics. If the Church Catechism had been written for the first time by certain persons in the nineteenth century, it would seem impossible that no reference should be made to such duties in the teaching of children. It is not too much to say that some writers of the nineteenth century would have put duties to animals before duty to our neighbours; so that the answer to the question, "What is thy duty towards the beasts?" would run, "My duty towards the beasts is to love them better than my neighbours."

If we turn from the direct enumeration of duty to incidental direction, there will in like manner

appear to be singularly little teaching in all Scripture as to our conduct to the beasts, though what little there is, is plain enough. Every beast of the earth and every fowl of the air is delivered into the hand of man; "Even as the green herb have I given you all things." (Gen. ix. 3, 4.) This dominion, lordship over the brutes, is especially given to man, (Gen. i. 28; see also Psa. viii. 6,) part of the glory and honour with which man is crowned. The moderns deny this dominion; in its place they assert the equality of the brutes with man. They are our "brothers."

In the law of Moses there are some directions to do good to the beasts. None of these is for the sake of the beast itself. It is either because they are the property of our neighbours, the same rules applying to raiment, or else to provide a close season during the breeding-time, (Deut. xxii. 1-8) or else to forbid some superstitious practice. The direction not to muzzle the ox when he treadeth over the corn (Deut. xxv. 4) we are told by S. Paul himself to be, not for the sake of oxen, but altogether for the instruction of Christians in their duties to the Christian ministry, (1 Cor. ix. 9, 10) just as in later times S. Anselm taught the doctrine of a judgment to come from the hunted hare. Not to seethe the kid in its mother's milk is a purely ritual direction, a command not to take

part in any of those sacrifices to the rural gods in which this ceremony was a chief part. The directions in Leviticus (xxii. 26-30) seem also to be ritual directions.

Like the Old, the New Testament contains little direct teaching on this point; but all Christians must believe that the acts of our Lord are recorded in the four Gospels as examples to be followed. A well-known Liberal writer, not an enthusiastic Christian, has declared that this "Galilean peasant" had greater insight into the science of morals than all the philosophers of the nineteenth century. The Gospel gives us several instances of His dealings with animals. He rides upon the colt into Jerusalem. He speaks of animals as if they were unworthy of notice: (S. Matt. vii. 6.) He works a miracle to give the Apostles an extraordinary draught of fishes; and He chooses His first disciples, who were to spread the Gospel throughout the world, from those who gained their living by the destruction of animal life. After the resurrection He eats "of a broiled fish and of an honeycomb," both animal products, and works another miracle for the destruction of animal life shortly before the final charge to S. Peter. None of these acts shows that Gnostic or Manichaean tenderness for animals which of late years we have been told is the duty of Christians.

There now remain two acts of our Lord which seem to cause as much horror to the friends of animals as the miracle of Cana does to the total abstainers. The Manichæans, as S. Augustine (*"Contra Faust. Man.,"* lib. vi. cap. v.) tells us, did not scruple to accuse our Lord of cruelty, for suffering the devils to enter into the herd of swine. Still more will they blame the command to S. Peter to take a fish by means of a hook. The fish is tortured and killed only, these men would say, that a piece of money may be found in its mouth, which could have been found as well anywhere else. But the Christian believes that it is blasphemy to condemn these acts of our Lord; with all reverence he draws the inference from them that the sufferings and the loss of life of animals are of no account, if human comfort or human happiness may be gained.

The same inference may be drawn from the words and actions of S. Paul. He quotes the Mosaic injunction not to muzzle the ox when he treads out the corn, and tells us that the command was not intended for the good of the ox, asking the question, as if it could have only one answer, "Doth God take care for oxen?" On the sea-shore of Malta a viper comes out of the heat and fastens on S. Paul's hand. It is immediately destroyed, not by a painless method. To have

crushed the head with a stone would have been far more in accordance with modern teaching than to have burnt the animal alive.*

The New Testament, therefore, contains nothing in favour of the modern teachings of the rights of brutes. It rather tells us, by the acts of our Lord and the teachings of S. Paul, that they have no rights which can prevail for a moment against the good or even the convenience of mankind.

From the New Testament let us pass to the early Christian writers. And in them we may notice the same absence of marked injunction that we find in the Old and New Testaments. We may here bring into court an unwilling witness, whose eloquent writings bear testimony to his zeal for the interests of the animal creation, but who is nevertheless obliged to own that "in the range and circle of duties inculcated by the early fathers those to animals had no place." Mr. Lecky says that Plutarch urges "that duty with an emphasis and a detail to which no adequate parallel can, I believe, be found in the Christian writings for at

* S. Paul's inspired interpretation of the Mosaic injunction is not, it appears, in great favour at the present time with the friends of brutes. Mr. E. B. Nicholson ("Rights of an Animal," p. 47, London, 1879) says, "I can never read with calmness the remark of Paul, 'Doth God take care for oxen?'" And the late Lord Shaftesbury is reported to have declined responsibility for all that Paul (*sic*) has said or done on this subject.

least seventeen hundred years." (W. E. H. Lecky, "History of European Morals," ch. iv.) And this statement is quite like that of Bayle, the sceptic, who, doubtless with no good intentions towards Christianity, asserts that no Christian writer on morals had ever condemned the infliction of pain on animals if it gave pleasure to man. ("Dictionnaire," *sub voce*, "Rorarius," note C.) And Mr. Lecky, whose learning cannot be denied, says that he has only been able to find one or two of the fathers who have mentioned with approbation "the humane counsels of the Pythagoreans." He gives a reference to one passage in the writings of one father, Clement of Alexandria, ("Strom.," lib. ii. cap. xviii.) the gist of which is that Pythagoras derived his mildness towards irrational creatures from the law. He gives as an instance his forbidding the use of young animals for food immediately after birth, "training man to gentleness by what is beneath him, by means of the irrational creatures." It will be seen that Clement only urges gentleness to the brutes as an education for men, not as part of animal rights; a view which admits of an orthodox interpretation. Even if it went further than it does in support of Pythagoreanism, it would prove little as to the current doctrine of the Church; for Clement (notwithstanding that he is often called "Saint Clement")

was refused canonization by Benedict XIV., even at the demand of a King of Portugal, John V., some say on account of the Gnostic, others the Arian, character of his writings.

The same may be said of the teachings of Arnobius, whose claim to be considered in any way orthodox is small. He condemns the sacrifices of the Old Testament on account of their cruelty, and speaks with disgust of the practice of eating flesh, because the lives of the brutes have to be taken. ("Adv. Gentes" lib. viii. cap. 4.)

Now let us turn to those writers to whom the Church has given the title of Doctor, and who, therefore, speak with authority as to her teachings. To begin with S. Jerome. He repeats S. Paul's question, "Doth God take care for oxen?" and answers it with "Certainly not." ("Epist. ad Fabiolam," cap. i.) S. Ambrose teaches us that the animals were created not for themselves, but for man; some because they were useful to him, others for the sake of affording him pleasure or amusement; and they were destroyed in the deluge, because, man being destroyed, there was no further need for their existence. ("De Noe et arca," cap. x.) And this, it may be said, is the general teaching of the fathers about the brutes, that they exist solely for our pleasure and advantage. The collect in the Gregorian Sacramentary against cattle plague

is an instance of the *lex orandi* being the *lex credendi*. In it we pray, not that the beasts may be eased from their sufferings, but that man may enjoy the fruit of their labours.

S. Gregory the Great, in his works, teaches us nothing on the rights of the brutes. He has a great deal to tell us in his interpretation of Scripture as to the meaning of the different beasts spoken of, and in nearly every case they are set forth as the enemies of mankind ; but though, like S. Ambrose, he has many opportunities of inculcating kindness to the beasts if it were a duty, yet he takes no advantage of such, and indeed preserves a most suggestive silence. That the animals are the enemies of mankind is, however, merely the common-sense view. It is only because man has been able to combine to destroy and keep under the brutes, that they have not long ago caused him to perish from the face of the earth.

But the most important positive statement is no doubt made by the great theologian of the West, S. Augustine. He had been in early life a Manichæan himself, and was therefore well acquainted with the misbeliefs of this sect. Besides their blasphemy at our Lord's acts, he tells us of their degraded tone of morals, and absurd scruples as to eating flesh ; in dealing with which the following important passage is found : " We see and hear

by their cries that animals die with pain, although man disregards this in a beast, with which, as not having a rational soul, we have no community of rights." ("De Morib. Manich., cap. lix.) In his treatise, "De Civitate Dei" (lib. i. cap. xx.) he tells us that the commandment, *Thou shalt not kill*, does not apply to the brutes, because they are not allied to us by reason, which is not given to them in common with us. By the just commands of the Creator, both their *life* and their *death* are given to our use. Now, the morality which satisfied S. Augustine and the early Fathers may surely be considered good enough for the English churchman of to-day.

The great doctor of the Middle Ages, S. Thomas Aquinas, though admitting the kindred of the lower animals to man, ("Summa," III. quæst. xliv. art. 4) yet asserts the domination of man over them, and his right to put them to *any use*, even to death, because this is involved in their being created for his use; (*Ibid.* II. ii. quæst. lxiv. art. i.) and in another place he says that the reason which appears in the acts of a brute belongs not to him, but to his Maker; just as an arrow which appears to go straight to the mark has no reason in itself, but gains its apparent reason from the archer; or as a watch from the watchmaker. So brutes are said to be prudent and wise, but there is in them

no reason or choice.* (*Ibid.* II. ii. quæst. xiii. art. 2, sub. fine.)

“The philosophical principles of S. Thomas determine the morality which regulates the conduct of man to the brutes,” say the authors of “A Catholic Dictionary,” published last year. “As the lower animals have no duties, since they are destitute of free will, without which the performance of duty is impossible, so they have no rights, for right and duty are correlative terms. The brutes are made for man, who has the same right over them which he has over plants or stones. He may, according to the express permission of God, given to Noc, kill them for his food; and if it is lawful to destroy them for food, and this without strict necessity, it must also be lawful to put them to death, or to inflict pain on them, for any good and reasonable end, such as the promotion of man’s knowledge, health, etc., or even for the purposes of recreation. But a limitation must be introduced here. It is never lawful for a man to take pleasure directly in the pain given to brutes, because, in doing so, man degrades and

* Compare Bishop Butler: “That brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those respects would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight: whether it be their own, indeed, is another question.” (“Analogy,” Part II. chap. iii.)

brutalizes his own nature." (Addis and Arnold's "Catholic Dictionary," *sub voce*, "Animals, lower.") These statements show the traditional opinion as to the brutes which are current among the largest community of Christians in the world : they have received the *imprimatur* of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, after passing the *nihil obstat* of the Rev. Father Keogh as censor, and the view that animals have no rights has therefore received the authoritative approval of the heads of the Roman Catholic religion in this country.

It is sometimes said that the popes have endeavoured to put a stop to the practice of baiting bulls in Spain. It is true that the popes have endeavoured to check this amusement, but it has been from motives of humanity, not from any desire to benefit the brutes. The loss of human life at these exhibitions had become so great that an endeavour was made to abolish them. (See Daniel Concina, "De Spectaculis Theatralibus," ed. sec. Romæ, 1754. Appendix altera, p. 241.) Pope Pius IX. refused to allow the establishment at Rome of a branch of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, declaring it to be a theological error that man owes any duty to the animals.*

* This statement is made solely on the authority of Miss Cobbe. ("Moral Aspects of Vivisection," Lond. 1877, third edit. p. 9.)

Billuart, the much-read Dominican Commentator on S. Thomas of the last century, admits that a man who kills beasts in a cruel way, and who takes pleasure in their pains, sins venially, because such a man could more easily bring himself to be cruel to his fellow-men. ("Summa S. Thom." "Tract. de Jure et Justitia," Diss. 10, Art. i.) This is exactly the teaching of the great guide in cases of conscience of our own communion, Jeremy Taylor. Before speaking of the pretended severity of the Manichees, he refers to the prohibition of the eating of blood, and says that "the doctors of the Jews expressed it by the not tearing a member of any live creature : which precept was the mounds of cruelty, God so restraining them from cruelty, even to beasts, lest they might learn to practise it upon men. For God sometimes places some laws for defensatives to others ; and by removing men afar off from impiety, He secures their more essen-

But it is not unlikely, seeing that it expresses the tradition of the Roman Catholic Church. On the same page a dictum of Cardinal Manning's is quoted : "To say we owe no moral obligations to the lower animals is simply odious and detestable." This may be contrasted with the *imprimatur* given to the statements quoted above from the "Catholic Dictionary," and with the difference which time has wrought in the teaching of the Cardinal as to the propriety of changes in the marriage laws. Some of his friends have felt it necessary to write to the newspapers and deny that total abstainers had been encouraged to become Roman Catholics on the ground that they would not have to taste the wine of the Eucharist. All these things lend some colour to the report that the Cardinal's views are somewhat Manichæan in their tendency.

tial duty. But even this very precept is, by all the world, taught to yield to necessity and to charity, and cruelty to beasts is innocent when it is charity to men : and therefore, though we do not eat them, yet we cut living pigeons in halves and apply them to the feet of men in fevers, and we rip the bellies of sheep, of horses, of oxen, to put into them the side of a paralytic ; and although to rude people and ignorant, such acts of security were useful, yet to Christians it is a disparagement to their most excellent institution, and the powers and prevalencies of God's Spirit, to think they are not upon better accounts secured in their essential duty. The Jews were defended from idolatry by a prohibition even of making and having images : but he is but a weak Christian who cannot see pictures without danger of giving them worship." * (*"Ductor Dubitantium," "The Rule of Conscience,"* book ii. chap. ii. rule ii. § 2, Heber's edit., vol. xii. p. 290.)

Every one knows that the philosopher, Descartes, more than two hundred years ago asserted that animals were but machines, and it is now pronounced by one of the highest modern biological authorities, Mr. Huxley, not only that such an

* The only king of England who laid down his life for the Church, and upon whom, since the Reformation, she has bestowed a kind of canonization, was one who amused himself with hunting, and gave the beasts from his parks to the physiologist Harvey, to be used in his experiments.

opinion cannot be refuted, but that at the present day, with all the advances that biology has made, it is more defensible than it was in the time of Descartes.* (See Mr. Huxley's essay on Animal Automatism in his "Science and Culture," p. 199.) It was the prevailing doctrine as to the brutes in France during the seventeenth century, though it was not accepted by the Jesuits, mainly, it would appear, because it received great support from the inhabitants of Port Royal. The piety of these religious men and women is known to all Christendom. The efforts of Antoine Arnauld, and of Pascal, in behalf of religion and morals will be admired as long as the French language lasts. Yet these saintly men did not hesitate to teach that animals should be treated as if they were machines; and of this it is said that they set the example.

A great dislike of any attempt to teach that the brutes have rights is shown by Bossuet, ("Connaissance de Dieu et de soimême," ch. v.) who says that the resemblance of the actions of the brute to those of man is deceptive. He condemns those who would make the brutes reason, for they desire to lower themselves to the level of the brutes that

* The Duke of Argyle, in a recent work, ("Unity of Nature," p. 98. London, 1884) applies the Cartesian theory to explain certain instincts, and revives against Locke the notion of innate ideas. Suarez amusingly disproves Descartes by quoting the text, "The ox *knoweth* his owner," which a machine could not.

they may live even as the beasts do. Such is the outcome of the teaching of Plutarch and Celsus on behalf of the brutes. The arguments would be enduring if there were nothing serious in them, but Bossuet declares they are mere excuses for sensuality, and man then becomes like a cowardly noble who refuses to remember his birth lest it should compel him to exertion and trouble. Our Bishop Berkeley, in his reply to the physician Mandeville, (*"Minute Philosopher,"* dial. ii., 2nd edit., 1732, vol. i. p. 106) takes the same ground. "Man and beast, having different natures, seem to have different faculties, different enjoyments, and different sorts of happiness. . . . A beast, without reflection or remorse, without foresight or appetite of immortality, without notion of vice, or virtue, or order, or reason, or knowledge! What motives, what grounds, can there be for bringing down man, in whom are all these things, to a level with such a creature? What merit, what ambition, in the minute philosopher to make such an animal a guide and rule for human life?" Bishop Butler* thus

* It has been said by a writer who does not give a reference, nor enclose the sentence within inverted commas, that it is an axiom of Bishop Butler "that every sentient creature has an indefeasible claim to be spared pain merely because it is sentient." There are no means at present for appraising the accuracy of the quotation, but the statement is singularly out of harmony with the argument which runs through the *"Analogy."* This great work (one copy of which is worth most of the literature of the nineteenth century) is a demonstration

expresses his opinion of the extent to which the brutes may be guides to us in conduct: "Man cannot be considered as a creature left by his Maker to act at random and live at large up to the extent of his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him, which is the condition brute creatures are in." (Sermons at the Rolls, III. upon Human Nature.)

Sympathy with the brutes thus met with little favour at the hands of a great theologian like Bossuet, or of two great Christian philosophers like Butler and Berkeley. They foresaw, feared, and condemned the elevation of the brute to a place

that the constitution of Nature is analogous to both natural and revealed religion; that the laws of Christianity may be expected to be like the laws of nature. Now, Nature is not sparing of pain; the infliction of it is her daily occupation. She nowhere declares, as part of the rights of brutes or of man, that every sentient creature has an indefeasible claim to be spared pain merely because it is sentient. If Butler has declared this he has pronounced that nature and revealed religion are no longer in accord, and he has contradicted himself. Henceforth, the garotter on the point of being flogged, and the schoolboy on the point of being caned, may appeal to Bishop Butler as saying that they have an indefeasible right to be spared pain. Bishop Butler gives too good an account of a boy brought up upon good-natured and liberal principles, in the sixth chapter of the first part of the "Analogy," to be a judge likely to give a decision in favour of either of these appellants. A little further on in the same work he declares the subserviency of the vegetable world to the animal, and of organized bodies to minds. (Part ii., ch. iii.) But if organized bodies are to be subservient to minds, how can this be carried out without the infliction of pain? That pain may be inflicted for no purpose whatever is a foolish proposition of the mock-humanitarians of the nineteenth century.

by the side of man. They saw that to make the brute in any way the equal, the brother (as the cant phrase now runs) of man would be to degrade man, to deprive him of all moral sense, truly to brutalize him. There has been a knot of writers, from Mandeville at the beginning of the last century, down to Mr. Darwin in our time, the main object of whose teachings has been the bestialization of man. Christians have hitherto endeavoured to develop the nobler part of man, "the soul," "the ruling faculty," whatever we may call it, and to make it the dominant feature of his character, treading under foot the part of our nature with which we touch the beasts. The philosophy in vogue to-day, which is the philosophy of Mr. Darwin, develops the brutal side of man's nature, and converts him into an irresponsible machine like the beast of the field ; it teaches that he has the same nature, the same soul, the same origin, and the same end as the brute. He is nothing more than the genus *Homo*, at the head, it is true, of the animal kingdom, but not to be distinguished from the beasts either in body or in mind ; and in his conduct, then, he may be even as they.

Whewell, who was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge before the connexion of the English Universities with Christianity had been severed, criticized unfavourably the law then

recent for the prevention of cruelty to animals. "This is a very remarkable kind of law, as being a very distinct instance of laws dealing with manners, as evidence of vicious dispositions, where no rights are violated. For animals can have no rights. And if it be said that humane men have a right not to be shocked by the sight of wanton cruelty, it may be said on the same ground, that truth-loving men have a right not to be shocked by wanton lying ; and the like ; which probably no one would assert as a ground of legislation" ("Elements of Morality," book v. chap. xii.)

If we look back upon the teachings of the masters in Christian ethics, we may sum up shortly what that teaching is. Our actions towards the beasts are in themselves neither good nor bad ; they are indifferent. But according to the motive from which they are done, they may become either bad or good. The wanton killing or maiming of animals is bad, because the man accustomed to kill or maim without sufficient reason will be cruel to his fellow-men. But if the animal be killed or maimed in order to attain some laudable end, the action becomes good and praiseworthy. Animals have in themselves no more rights than plants or stones ; the infliction of pain upon them is perfectly indifferent in itself, though the act may become good or bad according to circumstances.

If the pain be inflicted as a part of the act, say of hunting, fishing, an experiment for the increase of knowledge, or an act in any way designed for the benefit of man, it may be disregarded, because the act is done not for the sake of the infliction of pain, but for some other purpose ; the pain appears as an accidental, not an essential, part of the act. To take pleasure in the infliction of pain upon animals for its own sake is forbidden, because it reflects back upon the character of the man who inflicts it. And this law which governs our conduct to the beasts—that we are to judge of our actions according to the effect which they produce upon ourselves, according to the Gospel rule, “by their fruits ye shall know them”—teaches us that it is better to avoid all contact with beasts. Their life is made up of a series of acts which in beasts are neither good nor bad, but in man are the depth of depravity, such as gluttony, murder, theft, treachery, incest, rape ; all, in short, that we call beastliness. Now, from the outside likeness of the brutes to man, the effect of the sight of such acts is to familiarize man with crime, and thus to demoralize and brutalize him. And we see the effects of this in those who have the care of animals ; for example, what is the general character of those who have much to do with horses ? And amongst those who make pets

of animals, we do not find that humanity which is common amongst their own rank in life. If they have to decide whether a pet animal or a servant shall suffer, the decision is too often given in favour of the pet, and against humanity. So that we should avoid making friends of animals, and only have them in our houses, as either use or convenience demands. But we may be allowed to unbend our minds by sporting with animals, after the example set us by S. John the Evangelist, provided it be not done to excess ; for those who spend their time in nursing pet dogs and cats are rarely found ready to do their duty by their children, or to give any part of their leisure to the poor. As an example of what will come of making pets of animals, we have that delirium of Jumbo worship which took place a few years ago in the Zoological Gardens, to find a parallel to which we must go back to the time of the Ptolemies in Egypt, when a mob tore a Roman to pieces for having by chance killed one of the sacred dogs. The animal worshippers of England followed, as if he were a god or a hero, a lustful brute that was sent out of the country for his mischievous habits, and that killed the men that tended and fed him. The *cultus* of such a beast must mark the ebb tide of popular morals. This is the turning back into Egypt, to the worship of the calf: *Immolate homines vitulos adorantes.*

If ridicule were in any way a test of truth, as Shaftesbury held, we should not be long in making up our minds as to the value of the idea of treating animals with "courtesy," a proposal which will bring a smile upon the face of the most melancholy of persons. Animals should be treated with perfect indifference; they should not be petted, they should not be ill-treated. It should always be remembered that they are our slaves, not our equals, and for this reason it is well to keep up such practices as hunting and fishing, driving and riding, merely to demonstrate in a practical way man's dominion over the brutes.*

The Christian view, which is that of the intuitional moralists, that animals have no rights, and that we only consider our motives in dealing with them, is really the only consistent and practical theory. On these grounds we can understand the place to which animals have been hitherto consigned all over Christendom. No other theory is consistent until it become foolish. Once admit that animals have rights, and we move down an inclined plane on which we do not rest till we have given the brutes rights equal to those of man.

* A recent article in the *Churchman* with some such title as "Man's Dominion over the Lower Animals not Unlimited," hardly contains a statement which is accurate, or an argument which will bear examination. The editor pays a very small compliment to the intelligence of his readers by the insertion of such a production.

By degrees we must be forbidden to use them in any way, since the use of an animal necessitates the infliction upon it of pain at some part of its life. And then we shall be forbidden to murder them for food, and told to avoid the crime of cannibalism and a flesh diet.

The gradual development that we may expect is hinted at in a recent work from one of the English universities. There the professors of ethics are no longer bound to treat their science according to Christian principles. The very title of the work, "*Progressive Morality*," shows a departure from the Christian principles of immutable morals. In it we find the proposition "that the lower animals, as sentient beings, have a claim on our sympathies, and that consequently we have duties in respect of them." (Thomas Fowler, "*Progressive Morality*," ch. v. p. 193. London, 1884.) It may be pointed out that sympathies and feelings are a bad foundation for any ethical edifice ; and that it is a new assumption in morals that we are to have duties towards a being solely because it is sentient. All animals, then, if sentient, must have equal rights. Noxious animals are equally sentient with the most useful ; but, unless a man be a Buddhist or a Brahman, he will grant that noxious animals may be destroyed freely, and also by the readiest means, that which comes first to hand,

without regard to those means being free from pain. Mere sensibility to pain, then, cannot be accepted as the basis of the supposed rights of animals. What in the case of noxious animals determines man's conduct to them is not whether they be sentient, but whether they do him harm ; that is, the old doctrine of the Christian moralists, a position which may here and there be detected even in Mr. Nicholson's book, in which also the vivisection of noxious animals appears to be allowed. In his conclusions Professor Fowler follows this view more closely than Bentham, for he allows whatever may be useful to man, thus falling back on the old view ; he allows man to kill beasts, to hunt them, to put them to pain, if it be for man's advantage ; but at the same time he seems doubtful as to his own position and ground, for he says that our relations to animals in this age are "probably undergoing development."

The same uncertainty of sound may be detected in the utterances of the professor at Cambridge, and the same tendency to a certain amount of sentiment on the subject as at Oxford. Whether a decision be hard-hearted or not as little concerns a professor weighing the evidence on one side or other of an ethical question as it concerns a judge to know whether the decision which he gives is hard-hearted or not. All that both have to con-

sider is whether their decision be in accordance with the laws of morals in one case, or with the law of the land in the other. These are the words of the Cambridge professor :—

“There is a general agreement that we ought to treat all animals with kindness ; but it is questioned whether this is directly due to sentient beings as such, or merely prescribed as a means of cultivating kindly dispositions towards men. Intuitional moralists of repute have certainly maintained this latter view. I think, however, that common sense is disposed to regard this as a hard-hearted paradox, and to hold with Bentham, that the pain of animals is *per se* to be avoided ; but the point is one which I am not prepared dogmatically to determine.” (Sidgwick, “Methods of Ethics,” p. 239. London, third edit., 1884.)

Although the principles of these two professors differ greatly from those on which Christian teachers of morals base their conduct to the brutes, as the Cambridge professor allows, yet the practice they recommend is nearly the same ; and the sober utterances of these experts in questions of morals, contrast strongly with the feminine declamation of the modern advocates of the rights of brutes.

We may glance for the moment at an ancient system of ethics, which almost rose to the level

of Christianity, that of the Porch. Its teaching on the rights of brutes has been brought down to us by Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Zeno. He tells us that "the school in general maintain that there are no obligations of justice binding on us with reference to other animals, on account of their dissimilarity to us, as Chrysippus asserts in the first book of his treatise on justice; and the same opinion is maintained by Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on duty." (See Bohn's edition of Diogenes Laertius, "Life of Zeno," sec. lxvi. p. 306.) Thus the noblest system of ethics after Christianity taught that the brutes had no rights at the hands of man.

The teachings of the Epicureans on this matter do not seem to have survived; (see Zeller's treatise) but as they held that the souls of man perished, it seems not unlikely that it was part of their doctrine that brutes were on a level with man; the more so as Jeremy Bentham, the founder of modern Epicureanism, now the dominant philosophy, made duty to the brute a prominent part of his teaching.

In the Republic of Plato, Thrasyarchus defines justice as the interest of the stronger. The interest of man, therefore, must prevail over the interests of brutes. And there is no need for a Christian to be ashamed of this dictum. It is accepted by the most devout of the philosophers of the seventeenth

century, Pascal ; and our great philosopher, Butler, speaks of self-love as a thing to be improved as really as any principle in our nature. "So greatly are profligate men mistaken when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love ; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle." (*"Analogy,"* Part I. chap. v.)

It is the fashion now-a-days greatly to praise the speculations of Spinoza, in which his ethical system takes a prominent part. Those who refuse to listen to Christian teaching may be moved by the sayings of a Pantheist. He first proclaims his belief that any law which forbade the killing of beasts would be founded more on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. "I do not deny," he says, "that the brutes feel ; but I deny that on that account it is not lawful to think of our own advantage, and to use them at our will, and to do to them whatever shall be most convenient to us. They have not the same nature as we ; and their constitution is different in essence from our constitution." (*"Ethics,"* pars. iv. prop. xxxvii. schol. i.)

THE RECRUDESCENCE OF MANICHÆISM.

Purely Christian writers on theology and morals, those who have not been infected by the teachings of the last two hundred years, refuse to allow that

the brutes have any rights. Let us now turn to the other side, and see what systems, and what kind of men they are, that in past times, or in the present day, have been most active in teaching that we have duties to the brutes, or that they may claim in any way to have rights like those of man. We find it repeated over and over again by the advocates of the rights of the brutes that their ideas are of modern growth. The friends of the brutes claim that it is part of the general progress of mankind, from barbarism to civilization, that animals should be brought within the boundaries of ethics. To the Christian this statement carries its own condemnation. To him whatever is new in morals is untrue. But it was taught, long before Christianity, as will be seen very shortly, that the animals were almost, if not quite, on a level with man. It is true that such views, during the predominance of Christianity, were kept under, and almost completely in abeyance. Now that the Liberals have succeeded in checking the influence of Christianity, the rights of brutes have come again into notice. Who does not remember the tears of Hortensius (who defended the infamous Verres against the accusations of Cicero) on the death of a favourite *muræna*? or the maxims of Plutarch, who would not sell an ox who had grown old in his service, but could joke at his slave while

he was writhing under the lash? or of Celsus, the physician, whom Origen opposed? The Athenians put to death a boy because he was accustomed to blind birds, and then let them fly. Thus the notion of the rights of brutes was well known to the Christian writers, though it found no place in their ethics. Where Christianity is unknown, the rights of brutes have been often made an important part of religion, and as such zealously enforced. It is in the religions of the East that these rights are most upheld. Every one will remember the Brahman who dashed to pieces the microscope which showed him that the drop of water contained myriads of living things. For centuries there have existed in India hospitals for decayed cats and dogs; and poor men and women are there made to submit themselves to be eaten by vermin, because it is part of human duty to these insects. Two or three years ago, when a deputation came over to England from the Indian tribes to support the Ilbert bill, the Liberal newspapers tried to stir up sympathy with them by saying that these men were so holy that they would not kill a flea. It is not known that, with all their sympathy for animals, these men are in any way humane. A letter from the Oxford Mission to Calcutta, dated October 6, 1884, speaking of the Hindus, ends thus: "You cannot con-

ceive their callousness about their brother-men." Are the events of the Indian Mutiny already completely forgotten? As an instance of the little influence that kindness to the beasts has upon real humanity, the readers of Bacon's Essays will remember his story of the Turks who, he says, are a cruel people, yet nevertheless are kind to beasts, and give alms to dogs and birds; inso-much that a Venetian goldsmith had like to have been stoned at Constantinople for gagging a long billed fowl.

Since Mr. Maurice, some forty years ago, recommended Buddhism to the notice of his countrymen, the study of the religion of Buddha has become one of the fashionable caprices of the time. It was one of the maxims of Buddha not to hurt any living thing, and tenderness for animals takes an even more prominent part in his system than in the other Eastern religions. It is recorded that Buddha offered his own body as food to famished tiger cubs. Yet the practice of his religion does not tend to greater humanity. In China, Buddhism is widely spread, and has deeply influenced the other religions of the country, but the Chinese have a greater capacity for calmly inflicting torture upon their fellows than any other race. Thus, where kindness to animals, or even more, is enforced as part of religion, it does not seem to

be followed by any increased humanity or gentleness of disposition. And in our country, those who have been most active, say at Oxford, in upholding the rights of animals, are hardly those best known for their gentleness and humanity to their fellows. And the proposal to substitute experiments on man for experiments on animals is now so often made that it must be accepted as part of the inhuman creed of the friends of brutes. It matters nothing what advantage a thing may be to mankind so long as a brute is hurt by it. Woorara, without which the poor Indian would never taste flesh, is called the "hellish woorara," solely because it is used in the physiological laboratory; as the daily aid to a large tribe of singularly helpless men, it is not so much as thought of.

Mr. Lecky, whose sympathy with the brutes is undoubted, and whose evidence therefore cannot lightly be set aside, acknowledges that great and noble characters, like Sir Thomas More,* have done that for which in the present age they would be denounced as fiends. He also admits that moral worthlessness and an active sympathy with the brutes not unfrequently coincide. Asserting

* The process for the canonization of Sir Thomas More is now going on at Rome, and the *advocatus diaboli* might plead that skill in the practice of "cock-throwing" should be a bar to the progress of the suit. A more serious objection might be made that in *Utopia* unsectarian prayers are recommended for use.

that "the rights of animals had no place in the ethics of the Church" and that the "ardent philanthropy which regarded human interests as the one end, and the relation of man to his Creator as the one question of life, dismissed somewhat contemptuously as an idle sentimentalism, notions of duty to animals," of which contempt he gives S. Paul as an instance, Mr. Lecky says: "A refined and subtle sympathy with animal feeling is indeed rarely found among those who are engaged very actively in the affairs of life, and it was not without a meaning or a reason that Shakespeare placed that exquisitely pathetic analysis of the sufferings of the wounded stag, which is perhaps its most perfect poetical expression, in the midst of the morbid dreamings of the diseased and melancholy Jaques," the misanthropist, who Shakespeare tells us had also been "a libertine, as sensual as the brutish sting itself." The experience of mankind brings out a moral law that the greater friend a man is to the animals the greater enemy he will be to his own kind. The interests of man and the interests of the brute are really antagonistic. Human sympathies cannot embrace both at a time; what is gained for one will be lost to the other. Those who have been foremost in their advocacy of the rights of brutes in England have also been, in many cases, most heartless in inflict-

ing pain on their fellows. It has been possible to say of them that they were only brutes striving for brutes.

A carefulness of animal life and a profound indifference to human suffering have prevailed together from the earliest times throughout the East. The Manichæan who refused to give bread to a starving beggar, was shocked by the cruelty of the sacrifices of the Old Testament. And this religious abhorrence of the infliction of death or suffering upon animals undoubtedly springs from the principle which runs through the religions of the east, the Zoroastrian dogma of dualism. History teaches that wherever the principle of dualism is found, there follows immediately the inculcation of ascetic practices, of abstinence from marriage, wine, and flesh, practices which are the distinguishing notes of Manichæism. And the reverse: where we find these ascetic practices made a rule for all mankind, there we may be sure that the theory of the dual nature of the Godhead lies concealed. The voice which the great prophet of dualism, Manes, heard in the temple, "Eat no flesh, drink no wine, and abstain from marriage," has been the rule of practice for all who assert the existence of two divinities of equal power for good and evil. Its practice was the proof of Manichæism in the early Church, and was followed by the gravest censures

that it possessed.* Here failure in morals follows failure in dogma; and a corrupt faith causes a corrupt practice.

It cannot be said that the Manichæan heresy has ever shown any lack of vitality. Born in the East before written history begins, from Buddhist or Gnostic parents, in later times its favourite task has been the corruption of Christianity under the veil of orthodoxy. The theory of the dualism of the Godhead, of the existence of the two principles of Good and Evil, and of the dogma that all matter is vile and that the spirit only is noble, may be found in the teachings of those early sects which S. John rebukes with indignation in the last book of the New Testament. The heresies of the Gnostics, of Valentinus, and Marcion, had the same Oriental source, and were alike feared and condemned by the fathers of the second century. But it was Manes, the prophet of the third century, who gave a name and an abiding form to the doctrines that from his day to the present have not ceased to trouble the Church. The conversion of the great S. Augustine from Manichæism to Christianity is one of the triumphs of orthodoxy, and his treatises against the Manichæans will

* If any man abstained from marriage, flesh, or wine, not for exercise, but from abhorrence, he was to be held accursed, and if a bishop or priest abstained from wine or flesh on a feast day he was to be deprived.—“Apostolical Constitutions,” viii. 51 and 52.

remain for all time the armoury whence the Christian may furnish himself when he goes forth to do battle against the teetotaller, the mock humanitarian, and the breaker of marriage. Later on in history, both Leo the Great and Gregory the Great were forced to take active measures against the Manichæism which tried to conceal itself in the Church of Rome ; the same heresy continued to infect the East up to the time of the Crusades ; and from Bulgaria the Albigenses and Waldenses received the Manichæan tenets for which they were so nearly extirpated by the strong hand of Innocent III. True to its tactics, however, Manichæism found a home in the great Order founded by S. Francis of Assisi, in which it has continued to dwell, and thus, without great suspicion, to insinuate its teachings into a large part of the Roman Church.

Since the Renaissance, Manichæism has adopted many forms : it has settled in many Protestant sects, who are quite unsuspecting of the real nature of their tenets, but it has shown itself more active in some form of Freethought, Scepticism, or Liberalism. The modern assertions of the rights of brutes first began with those who have been the most bitter enemies of Christianity. With these, the great aim has been to degrade man to the level of the brutes ; it was so with Mandeville, the first in this country to assert the rights of brutes, who

considered it a vulgar error that vice was hurtful, and sneered at any attempt to teach even reading and writing to the children of the poor. Jeremy Bentham's opinions as to Christianity are too well known to be specified here; it is to his attacks on the Christian theory of marriage that we owe the Divorce Court, and the odious attempts to alter the marriage law, and he is said to have been the first to propose legislation for the protection of animals. Voltaire has the reputation of being the first in France to assert the rights of brutes, (see the "Dict. Encyclop.," *sub voce*, Bêtes) and Robespierre, the hero in every way worthy of the French Revolution, was the first to make laws in favour of animals.*

Such are the sources whence the doctrine of the rights of brutes has been derived in modern times, from the most destructive, the most cynical, the most worthless, the most cruel of mankind. And even in the present day, when these views have

* Kindness to animals was quite fashionable among the men who were leaders in the Reign of Terror, and who daily sent hundreds of their fellow-men to the scaffold. About the time of the September massacres one of these wretches was waited upon by a lady in order to beg his protection for her relations. He would not even listen to her, and as she was withdrawing, full of despair and confusion, she accidentally trod upon the foot of his beloved spaniel. He turned furiously upon her, saying: "Madam, have you no humanity?" (See Georges Duval, "Souvenirs de la Revolution," book iii., p. 182. Paris, 1842.) Marwood, the common hangman, was very fond of animals, and was especially averse to vivisection.

spread amongst us into popular Christianity, we shall see little to envy in the characters or circumstances of those who are the most vehement amongst the friends of animals.

The ideas fostered by the societies for the protection of animals are indeed little, if at all, removed from pure Paganism. There is a pamphlet set forth by certain members, clerical, medical, and lay, of the International Association for the Total Suppression of Vivisection, with which is united the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection, in the shape of a letter to Mr. Gladstone, called "The Woman and the Age," and published by Mr. E. W. Allen, of 11, Ave Maria Lane. Though it is indeed such stuff as would make fools stare, and wise men at a loss, yet it is useful to show us what is the consistent development of the opinions of the friends of animals. There are several theses maintained: It is wrong to eat flesh. The true religion fell when men began to make material offerings of blood, cleverly turning round the sacrifice of Cain and Abel to mean its exact contrary;* the animals are our brethren. The doctrine of the transmigra-

* The society probably does not know how greatly its tenets resemble those of the Ophites or Cainites, a sect of the Gnostics, who worshipped serpents, and revered Cain as the father of mankind, because, though a murderer of his brother, he yet would not shed the blood of animals in sacrifice.

tion of souls is the foundation of all religion. Clairvoyance is the means by which all nature's coveted secrets are surrendered to man. The science of this age declares that cannibalism is the perfect way in diet. And the like. Yet all this Pythagorean raving is dated on the Christian festival of Easter, 1881. Esoteric Buddhism should rather give a date to such a production. Though we may laugh at the folly of the pamphlet, yet it is conclusive proof of the position of the convinced and advanced friends of animals. If they may only speak freely, they detest Christianity.*

We have only to look around us to perceive how deeply the Manichæan views have entered into the beliefs of those who still call themselves Christians. The great sale of a book called "Modern Christianity, a Civilized Heathenism," is evidence of this. From its first page to its last it was but a thinly disguised apology for Manichæism, passing itself off, as Manichæism always does, for a purified Christianity. Straws show the way the wind blows. Thus, why do the uneducated classes

* The following sentences appear in what looks like a serious leaflet, printed at Trieste, "for the benefit of the Human Race and Animal Emancipation." Speaking of the Apocalyptic vision, "S. John saw the lion, the calf, the eagle, and horses near the throne. They were suffered in God's immediate presence, and permitted to praise him. *No man was found worthy to open the book,* but the lion and the lamb were." The writer goes on to propose, it need not be said, that men should be given over to the experimental physiologist.

speak of an atheist as one who believes in neither god nor devil; and the educated insert at the end of the Lord's Prayer of the Revised Version, "deliver us from the Evil One," if they be not saturated with dualism? If we take modern practice and compare it with the practice of the Manichæans in the early Christian centuries, we shall see how alike they are. S. Augustine tells us that it was not the gratification of lust, but the procreation of children that the early Manichæans abhorred. The notorious "Fruits of Philosophy" show the ideas of our own day to be identical with those of the fourth century. All the impurities of Gnosticism have been revived in our age. There are also the Divorce Court, the Deceased Wife's Sister Bill, the Married Women's Act, and all the legislation of recent years which has done its best to break up the old Christian doctrine that man and wife are one.

The early Manichæans refused wine because it contained a large infusion of the evil principle. The modern Manichee says that alcohol is the devil in solution. He tells us he would die rather than save his own or another's life by taking or giving a glass of wine, and that if our Lord really changed water into wine in the miracle of Cana, he would renounce Christianity. Or if we take up any book printed under the protection of one

of the dissenting sects, we shall find that all reputation for goodness depends upon the amount of support given to total abstinence. Did a man help on the "temperance" cause? All is well. Was he a moderate drinker? Nothing more need be said: his lot is with Judas. This is the *articulus cadentis vel stantis ecclesiæ*, and every one is judged according to his conformity on this point with the Manichæan heresy.

The early Manichæans taught that man and the brute animals had the same souls;* the modern teach that the origin and nature of man and the beast are the same, and that therefore to eat the flesh of beasts is cannibalism, and to inflict pain upon them, even for the benefit of man, inhuman. And here it may be noticed that the Manichæan has acted wisely in giving the name of a virtue, an acknowledged virtue, to his practices. The registered concubinage of the modern Liberal is dignified with the name of marriage. Total abstinence from fermented liquors is called by the name of the Christian virtue of temperance. And kindness to the animals is confounded with the duty of humanity, a duty which from its very name can be shown only toward man.

* The Aristotelians and schoolmen taught that both plants and animals had souls, but for man was reserved the reasonable soul, an expression which has found its way into the Athanasian Creed, in an explanation of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

The revival of the doctrine of the rights of brutes is thus only a part of the great wave of Paganism, Manichæism, or Liberalism (the same thing under different names) which is now passing over Europe. The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, with his father, was the founder of the modern school of liberal philosophy, which by taking free-will from man degrades him to the level of the brutes, declared that the theory of the existence of two equal powers of good and evil, which is the foundation stone of Manichæism, was the only idea of God that he could reconcile with reason. And Mr. Froude, writing also from a Liberal standpoint, adopts the Gnostic views of the physician Celsus, with his doctrine of the rights of animals, a teaching which the nineteenth century has merely reproduced and asserted, but which was combated by Origen in the second century, as destructive of the real principles of Christianity. To the Liberals we owe the relaxation of the marriage bond, and other impurities of the age. These represent the licentious side of Manichæism, while the ascetic side is brought into view by those who are total abstainers, on the ground that it is in itself wrong to drink wine, or who say that it is immoral, by enslaving animals, to make them subserve the comfort and convenience of man. They all, however, belong to one sect. They are not

Christians at all. They are Manichæans, separated from Christianity by a deep abyss, because they are not at heart worshippers of the one true God, but are worshippers also of the evil principle, the author of all ill, the devil himself. To them some superstition of the East will seem preferable to real Christianity. They will follow the teachings of the Dhammapada rather than those of the Gospel. They will choose Buddha as their teacher rather than our Lord.

The friends of the brutes have over-reached themselves in their agitation. Abstention from wanton cruelty all will be ready to grant them; but they have made such large demands for their clients that they have caused men to look into first principles. It is found that an advocacy of the rights of brutes is associated with the lowest phases of morality, and that kindness to the brutes is a mere work of supererogation, a sort of luxury, and in no way a duty or part of ethics, while those who are most active in their charity to animals are often grossly inhuman. Their intemperance in all ways, their fury, their rage, their disregard of means if only their end can be attained, their spitefulness, their blasphemies, have been as well marked in modern as in ancient times. S. Augustine describes their character thus, "They refused to help a needy man with

bread, while they denounced our Lord Himself as cruel because He destroyed the herd of swine." What they are likely to say of Christian doctrine on these points need not be speculated. "If they have called the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of His household?"

